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Abstract
What is the status of a cat in a virtual reality environment? Is it a real ob-
ject? Or part of a fiction? Virtual realism, as defended by D. J. Chalm-
ers, takes it to be a virtual object that really exists, that has properties 
and is involved in real events. His preferred specification of virtual 
realism identifies the cat with a digital object. The project of this paper 
is to use a comparison between virtual reality environments and sci-
entific computer simulations to critically engage with Chalmers’s posi-
tion. I first argue that, if it is sound, his virtual realism should also be 
applied to objects that figure in scientific computer simulations, e.g. to 
simulated galaxies. This leads to a slippery slope because it implies an 
unreasonable proliferation of digital objects. A philosophical analysis of 
scientific computer simulations suggests an alternative picture: The cat 
and the galaxies are parts of fictional models for which the computer 
provides model descriptions. This result motivates a deeper analysis of 
the way in which Chalmers builds up his realism. I argue that he buys 
realism too cheap. For instance, he does not really specify what virtual 
objects are supposed to be. As a result, rhetoric aside, his virtual real-
ism isn’t far from a sort of fictionalism.
Keywords
Computer simulation, model, fictional model, ontology, fictionalism.
1 Introduction
Suppose that ten-year old Tina has asked her parents for a cat as a 
Christmas present. At Christmas, the parents give her a headset with 
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a stereoscopic display and a device. The headset is connected to a 
computer that is programmed to produce visual impressions of a din-
ing room. In this room, a cat moves around. Using the little device, 
Tina can move around in the dining room too, which is to say that 
the perspective from which the room appears changes in a systematic 
way depending on Tina’s input on the device. If Tina sees the cat 
close nearby, she can use a switch on the device to pet the cat. As a 
reaction, the cat will typically purr. Suppose for the sake of argument 
that the cat in the dining room does everything a cat typically does.
Many people would think that this present is a cheat. They would 
understand if Tina is deeply disappointed. They would not just take 
it that Tina hasn’t been given what she had asked for. Rather, they 
would think that Tina has just been given a headset with a device 
and no cat-like object whatsoever. If there was any talk about a cat, it 
would be about mere fiction, or so they would think.
David J. Chalmers disagrees. On his view, Tina has been given a 
virtual cat. According to what he endorses under the label “virtual 
realism”, the virtual cat is a real object. It can have properties, e.g. 
be gray, and be involved in events, e.g. jump on a chair. It can further 
figure in non-illusory perceptual experience. Chalmers brilliantly 
defends this position in his Petrus Hispanus Lectures (Chalmers 
2017). But isn’t the position a sort of cheat too? Is realism really 
vindicated for virtual reality (VR, for short)?
The aim of this paper is to critically discuss Chalmers’s virtual 
realism and the arguments he puts forward in favor of his position. I 
focus on Chalmers’s preferred specification of virtual realism, which 
includes what he calls virtual digitalism. I’ll begin by briefly recap-
ping Chalmers’s virtual realism in Section 2. Section 3 compares 
virtual reality environments with scientific computer simulations. 
I argue that, if it is sound, Chalmers’s view can, and should, be ex-
tended to all sorts of scientific computer simulations. I suggest that 
this is a slippery slope because it leads to implausible consequences. 
Section 4 steps back and asks what went wrong in the construction 
of virtual realism. I identify several problems and argue that Chalm-
ers establishes realism too cheap since fictionalism is just around the 
corner. This is not to deny that Chalmers’s virtual realism raises a 
number of intriguing issues. I draw my conclusions in Section 5.
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2 Virtual realism à la Chalmers
Back to Tina’s cat. What does it mean to say that it is a real object? 
And what does Chalmers’s virtual realism imply for the cat?
By construction, the cat “lives” in a dining room. The latter is an 
example of what Chalmers calls a virtual (reality) environment (2017: 
312).1 The environment has three characteristic properties, viz. of 
being immersive, interactive and computer-generated (2017: 312–3). 
A virtual environment is immersive since it produces perceptions of an 
environment from a view within it. When Tina wears the headset 
and the computer program is running properly, she has experiences 
of a dining room as seen from a certain position and angle. A virtual 
environment is interactive because the human user can influence the 
environment. As far as Tina is concerned, she can use the device to 
move around and to pet the cat, which causes the virtual cat purring. 
Finally, a virtual environment is computer-generated, no doubts about 
this in our example.
Chalmers would call the dining room not just a virtual environ-
ment, but also a virtual world (2017: 314). The cat is part of this vir-
tual world or an object in the virtual world and for this reason called 
a virtual object (ibid.).
When developing virtual realism, Chalmers adds to a venerable 
tradition of philosophical thought. Indeed, in the view of Wright 
(1993: 1), the debate about realism is constitutive of Western philos-
ophy. As Wright further notes (1993: 2–3), realism is now often dis-
cussed with respect to a specific domain of discourse. Here, we are 
obviously concerned with talk about virtual reality environments. 
As is typical of every variety of realism, Chalmers’s virtual realism is 
a package of several commitments, some of which are metaphysical, 
while others are epistemological. Let’s consider each component of 
the package in turn by contemplating Tina’s cat.
The metaphysical commitment is that Tina’s cat really exists, that 
it really has properties and that it is involved in events that really 
take place. This isn’t too informative unless we know what the cat 
is and what it means to say that it has properties etc. Now Chalm-
ers does address these questions very explicitly, and at this point his 
1 References are to Chalmers 2017, unless specified otherwise.
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virtual digitalism comes into play (2017: 311). So throughout my pa-
per, Chalmers’s virtual digitalist specification of virtual realism will 
be my focus.
Virtual digitalism takes the cat to be a digital object (2017: 317). 
Such an object is constituted by computational processes in the com-
puter hardware that produce a virtual environment. Chalmers adds 
that, to a first approximation, the cat can be regarded as a data struc-
ture, which in turn is grounded in computations in the hardware. 
He doesn’t consider more complicated settings in which a virtual 
object is realized using several data structures, and so won’t I. As 
far as properties are concerned, virtual realists hold that the cat qua 
digital object instantiates virtual properties (2017: 320–1). For Chalm-
ers’s virtual digitalist brand of virtual realism, these are digital prop-
erties. For instance, the virtual, and thus digital, greyness of the cat 
comprises those aspects of the digital object (i.e., roughly, of the 
data structure) that produce the grayish appearance of the cat in the 
headset. Chalmers thinks that this account can be extended to other 
virtual/digital properties. In particular, at least some virtual proper-
ties are characterized by their roles in virtual reality (2017: 323–4). 
A similar story is told about virtual, or digital, events. In general 
terms, then, the metaphysical commitments of Chalmers’s virtual re-
alism are as follows (2017: 311):
VR-M1 Virtual objects really exist and are digital objects;
VR-M2 Events in virtual worlds are largely digital events that 
really take place;
Here, VR-M2 does not explicitly talk about the instantiation of 
properties, but for the purposes of this paper, the latter may be con-
sidered as a special sort of event. For reasons of simplicity, I will 
focus on the instantiation of properties in what follows. For the time 
being, we can ignore the qualification “largely” in VR-M2.
In our example with the cat, the epistemological commitment of 
virtual realism holds that Tina has, or may at least have, non-illusory 
perception of the cat (2017: 326–33). Tina can thus know about the 
cat by observing it. She will only have non-illusory perceptions of the 
cat, of course, if she doesn’t take the cat to be a real cat because she 
would then be deceived. But Chalmers argues that experienced users 
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of virtual reality environments form a conception of virtual reality. 
Their belief that they are concerned with a virtual world then acts 
as a theoretical assumption that informs the content of their per-
ceptions. Thus, if Tina is an experienced user of her virtual reality 
device, the content of her perceptual states is e.g. that the virtual cat 
instantiates the virtual property of being gray. Chalmers masterfully 
develops this part of his view by comparing with the perception of 
mirror images.—In general terms, the epistemological commitment 
of virtual realism reads (2017: 311):
VR-E Experiences in virtual reality involve non-illusory percep-
tion of a digital world;
Chalmers’s virtual realism finally has an evaluative component (2017: 
337–44). In our example, it boils down to the claim that there is no 
aspect in which Tina’s interaction with the virtual cat is significantly 
less valuable than the interaction with a real cat. (Tina’s parents were 
very happy when they were told this by the seller in the department 
store in which they bought the virtual reality device.) One crucial 
thought here is that Tina isn’t really subject to illusions, when she 
plays with the virtual cat (2017: 339). Another argument is that, 
unlike in Nozick’s experience machine, Tina isn’t degraded to a pas-
sive recipient of all sorts of influences from the computer. Rather, 
her decisions have an impact on what’s going on in the virtual din-
ing room (2017: 339–40).2 In general terms, Chalmers’s evaluative 
claim is (2017: 311):
VR-V Virtual experiences of a digital world can be about as valu-
able as non-virtual experiences of a non-digital world.
Since such an evaluation is not typical for other domain-specific real-
isms, I won’t discuss it here.
For the purposes of the following, it is useful to briefly recap the 
arguments that Chalmers offers for his position.
The argument from causal power supports the identification of virtual 
objects with digital objects. The first premise is that virtual objects 
2 Of course, interaction is not specific to VR environments, but rather a 
feature of so-called interactive media, more generally, e.g. interactive novels 
(Chalmers 2017: 348). See Lopes (2001), Smuts (2009) and Wildman and Wood-
ward (2018) for accounts of interactive media and the relevant type of interaction.
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can cause all sorts of things (e.g. virtual events, but also experiences 
in the user). Since it is really digital objects that cause these sorts of 
things, virtual objects must be digital objects. Put this way, the argu-
ment presupposes that there are virtual objects with causal powers. 
But Chalmers thinks that the argument has even some pull if we only 
admit that there seem to be objects with causal powers (2017: 318).
The argument from perception too is supposed to support the meta-
physical claim that virtual objects are digital objects. The argument 
assumes that we perceive virtual objects. It is further assumed that, 
quite generally, the objects of our perception are the causes of our 
perceptions. If we add the premise that digital objects cause the per-
ceptions of virtual objects, the identification follows (2017: 318–9).
Finally, the terraform argument (2017: 343–4) supports the evalu-
ative component of virtual realism. We can bracket this argument 
for the purposes of the following. Nor need some arguments that 
Chalmers lists as possible counterarguments against virtual realism 
detain us. The reason is that Chalmers debunks them successfully 
(e.g. 2017: 320).
The explicit arguments in favor of virtual realism thus support 
parts of realism, but assume other parts of it. The dialectical situa-
tion may thus be charitably reconstructed as follows: It is natural to 
interpret virtual reality in terms of virtual objects, their properties 
and events involving them (e.g. 2017: 329–30, 335). The argument 
from causal powers then shows that we have to identify the virtual 
objects with digital objects, as virtual digitalism has it (VR-M1). It is 
also natural to say that we perceive virtual objects. If we assume so, 
the argument from perception shows once more that virtual objects 
are digital objects. Based upon this view of virtual objects, Chalmers 
constructs properties and events involving the virtual objects. They 
yield the truth of the second metaphysical claim (VR-M2). Restrict-
ing the attention to experienced users of virtual reality, the epis-
temic commitment becomes true as well (VR-E).
Realism with respect to a certain domain of discourse has typical 
opponents. Chalmers takes it that his main opponent is a fictionalist 
(2017: 315), who holds that virtual cats are part of a fiction.3
3 It‘s actually not clear why a fictionalist has to reject VR-V once it has been 
purged from its realist presuppositions. It’s not incompatible with fictionalism 
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So far for Chalmers’s story about the cat. But will it really con-
vince Tina that she got a real cat-like object?
3 From virtual reality to computer simulations
3.1. Establishing a parallel
Tina’s father is a computer scientist. He helps natural and social sci-
entists to develop and run scientific computer simulations.4 In the 
simulations, e.g. molecules, cosmic structures or markets are simu-
lated. This is to say that computer programs are run that deliver 
proxies to solutions to mathematical equations. The equations have 
an empirical interpretation in terms of molecules, cosmic structures, 
or markets. In fact, the equations constitute the core of models of 
their respective target systems. The models are often much ideal-
ized, and the computer typically doesn’t really solve the equations 
exactly; nevertheless, simulations of this kind are often used to pre-
dict and to understand the dynamics of the respective target systems.
When simulation scientists describe their simulations, they typ-
ically tell a story that describes what’s going on in the model. To 
expand just one example, regarding simulations of cosmic structure 
formation, they would say that the dark matter assumed to fill the 
Universe is traced using so-called dark matter particles (see Bertsch-
inger 1998 for details). The dark matter particles have a specific mass 
and are almost homogeneously distributed in space at an early stage of 
the Universe. They then interact via gravitational forces. What cos-
mologists observe in the simulations is that tiny deviations from the 
otherwise homogeneous distribution of the particles grow to form 
large matter clumps that are interpreted as galaxies or galaxy clusters.
Solutions to this model are evaluated using a simulation program, 
which outputs lists of numbers specifying the positions of the dark 
matter particles at the times considered. The output “data” are often 
to claim that engaging with e.g. virtual cats in VR environments is as valuable as 
engaging with real cats.
4 For the sake of brevity, I will sometimes only speak of simulations, when 
referring to computer simulations.
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visualized using plots that show how the matter distribution in the 
Universe looks like from a certain perspective. One can also con-
struct animations that show the evolution of the structures or that 
allow one to “travel” through the Universe.5
When Tina’s parents try to explain to her that, according to vir-
tual realism, she has not just been given a headset, but also a virtual 
cat, Tina turns to her father: “If I now own a real object with my 
virtual cat, then you deal with virtual galaxies and markets as real 
objects on a daily basis.”
Tina has a point. To stick with our example, suppose that, in a 
simulation of cosmic structure formation, a clump of dark matter 
particles arises that has the mass and shape of a certain type of gal-
axy. The working scientist observes it on the screen and takes it to 
be a simulated galaxy, maybe even a counterpart of a real galaxy.6 
Tina’s point then is that, if Chalmers’s virtual realism is on the right 
track, the simulated galaxy too qualifies as a virtual object that is 
really there etc. Here is why virtual realism applies to the simulated 
galaxy: We may regard the virtual galaxy as a data structure and 
say that it is somehow grounded in physical processes on the com-
puter hardware, so it is a digital object (VR-M1).7 The virtual galaxy 
has certain virtual properties (e.g. a certain mass) and is involved in 
virtual events (e.g. mergers of galaxies; VR-M2). Moreover, if the 
working scientist looks at appropriate pictures or movies of the gal-
axy and is aware that the galaxy is part of a simulation, she can be 
5 Check e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YjUICiYlCYE (last checked 
June 11, 2019).
6 Here, “simulated galaxy” means a computer-generated galaxy part of a com-
puter simulation, and not a real galaxy that has been considered in a computer 
simulation. Note that some computer simulations have specific real-world objects, 
e.g. specific galaxies, as targets, while other simulations do not refer to specific re-
al-world systems (but rather simulate a couple of possible galaxies; cf. 2017: 334).
7 Strictly speaking, in a computer simulation of cosmic structure formation, a 
galaxy does typically not correspond to a data structure such as an array since the 
information about the galaxy is not stored in one array of data. The reason is that 
the galaxy in the simulation does not consist of a fixed set of dark matter particles; 
rather, particles can escape the galaxy or become absorbed by it. Chalmers (2017: 
317) is aware of this problem, and I‘ll not use it to argue against him, but rather 
focus on examples in which virtual objects do correspond to data structures.
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said to have non-illusory perceptions of the virtual galaxy (VR-E). It 
thus seems that, if virtual realism works, it extends to the simulated 
galaxy and to all kinds of simulated entities alike.
Does it really? There are some differences between virtual real-
ity environments and scientific computer simulations. Let us discuss 
whether they have an impact on the applicability of virtual realism, 
provided that the latter holds true for virtual reality environments.
A irst striking difference is that most scientific computer simula-
tions are not used to produce perception-like states in headsets. In 
fact, most often the results of computer simulations are not fed into 
headsets at all; if the results are visualized, the pictures are often 
poor and not animated. They are typically observed on a screen such 
that scientists will be aware of the screen. It may thus be argued that 
the settings simulated in scientific computer simulations are not im-
mersive in the sense of Chalmers and that virtual realism only applies 
to virtual environments, which are immersive. In more detail, it may 
be said that, due to the lack of immersion, the simulated galaxies 
are not really observed, which is to reject VR-E. It may further be 
argued that they don’t instantiate properties such as being virtually 
bluish, if nobody observes them, which is to reject VR-M2. It may fi-
nally be claimed that, due to the lack of a rich visualization, we can-
not call the simulated galaxies real objects, which is to deny VR-M1.
But all this is not convincing. The difference in terms of visual 
presentation doesn’t make a real difference to virtual realism. For 
one thing, when astronomers observe real galaxies, they are typi-
cally sitting in front of a screen and looking at pictures that look 
like the ones of simulated galaxies. If they can be said to see the real 
galaxies, which is not implausible (see Shapere 1982 for a discussion), 
then why not say that the simulation scientists see simulated galaxies? 
For another thing, whenever simulated objects are not at all visual-
ized or only very poorly so, it is still true that the simulated objects 
may be visualized or better visualized and used to produce images in 
a headset. This option is available because there are standard means 
to produce visualizations and to feed them into suitable headsets. If 
the crucial outputs of the simulation program are stored e.g. in a file, 
then the simulated galaxies may be visualized without any need to 
change the simulation program. This possibility suffices to grant the 
possibility of perception and the truth of VR-E. (I here read VR-E is 
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a hypothetical conditional: If somebody has experiences of a virtual 
object, the corresponding mental states are non-illusory.) This is also 
sufficient to ascribe simulated objects all kinds of properties (VR-
M2) because, if we follow Chalmers’s argument, the instantiation of 
properties like colors only depends on the conditional that certain 
experiences are produced, if a suitable headset is used (2017: 322). 
It may be objected that virtual realism, in particular VR-M1, never-
theless only applies to objects that are in fact perceived via headsets. 
But this doesn’t seem what Chalmers thinks (2017: 349). Also, this 
would lead to an extremely weird version of realism according to 
which the objects claimed to be real only exist if they are perceived. 
This is in fact a sort of idealism. The conclusion then is that lack of 
factual visualization and poor quality of visualization don’t make a 
difference for virtual realism.
A second striking difference is that computer simulations are typi-
cally not interactive. True, the simulation scientist is free to set the 
initial conditions of the simulation. This activity of setting up the sim-
ulated world is sometimes compared to intervention typical of exper-
iments (see Beisbart 2018: 177, 194–7 for a discussion). But in most 
simulations, computer scientists do not interfere with the simulated 
system, once the simulation has been initialized. In fact, most simula-
tion programs don’t allow for such interference. It may thus be said 
that virtual realism, in particular VR-M1-2, cannot be established for 
simulated galaxies and the like since no interaction is possible.
But again this is not convincing, and lack of interaction doesn’t 
make a difference to virtual realism. One possible strategy for argu-
ing this point would be to say that a simulation program may easily be 
changed as to allow for interaction. This may be thought to show that 
interaction is possible, and more cannot be required because, even in 
a virtual environment of the sort Chalmers considers, the user may as 
a matter of fact decide not to interact with the virtual environment, 
which is to say that factual interaction is not the point. But, maybe, 
this strategy stretches things too far because, for most computer sim-
ulations, it is natural to say that the user lacks the ability and thus the 
possibility to interact. A related worry is that we wish to establish 
virtual realism for real simulations and not for suitably modified ones.
A more promising strategy is to recall the way in which Chalm-
ers makes a case for virtual realism. There, interaction is crucial for 
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defusing worries to the effect that engaging with a virtual world is as 
idle as Nozick takes it to be to be hooked up to the experience ma-
chine. Otherwise, interaction doesn’t much matter for Chalmers’s 
argumentation. In particular, the construal of virtual objects and 
their having properties etc. is not affected. Nor are the arguments 
from causal power and perception. So why not say that computer 
simulations contain virtual objects too?
In his lectures, Chalmers considers possible extensions of virtual 
realism e.g. to mixed environments (2017: 344–8). The extensions 
that he accepts allow for interaction—this is certainly so with mixed 
environments and interactive novels, and arguably also for lucid 
dreams and hallucinations. But no systematic reason is given why 
virtual realism should be restricted to environments that allow for 
interaction.8 Chalmers may only resist the extension by saying that 
virtual realism is more natural for virtual environments if interac-
tion is possible. But such an appeal to naturalness wouldn’t carry 
conviction. First, it is very natural to describe computer simulations 
in terms of the underlying model and its constituents, e.g. galaxies. 
Second, what appears natural is often a matter of context as well as 
education and training and cannot make a decisive difference to mat-
ters of metaphysics.9
8 Indeed, Chalmers allows for “improper” virtual reality environments for 
which one or the other defining characteristics of proper virtual reality is missing 
(2017: 313–4). It is not entirely clear to what extent virtual realism is supposed to 
apply to improper virtual reality environments. If it extends to improper virtual 
reality, then clearly interactivity cannot make a decisive difference. An analogous 
point applies to other differences on my list that only turn on one the three defin-
ing characteristics of virtual reality.
9 As far as interaction is concerned, there is an interesting parallel with the 
debate about scientific realism, i.e., the debate whether we have knowledge about 
unobservable entities and their properties. Hacking (1983) has famously argued 
that what really made a positive difference for knowledge about, say, electrons 
was our ability to interact with them. He thinks that we can claim knowledge 
about unobservable entities, if we “manipulate them using well-understood low-
level causal properties” (1983: 274). Likewise, virtual realists may claim that we 
are entitled to take virtual objects as real if we interact with them. But Hacking’s 
criterion doesn’t do much work in the debate about scientific realism. To say that 
we manipulate electrons is to describe some of our actions in terms of a certain 
vocabulary, which apparently refers to unobservables. Skeptics with anti-realist 
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A third noteworthy difference between virtual reality environ-
ments and computer simulations is that the latter often cover unob-
servable aspects of reality. This is to say that the equations to which 
the simulations yield approximate solutions often refer to character-
istics the instantiation of which cannot be observed (unobservable 
characteristics, for short). Very often, these characteristics will be 
those of unobservable objects, e.g. the distances between, or the so-
called color charges of, quarks (see e.g. Bissey et al. 2007 for simu-
lations of quarks). It may now be said that virtual realism does not 
apply to simulated unobservable objects and their unobservable char-
acteristics. For one thing, how can we talk about non-illusory per-
ception of virtual quarks (VR-E), if real quarks cannot be perceived, 
either? For another thing, it may be claimed that the metaphysical 
components (VR-M1-2) of virtual realism become implausible when 
we talk about unobservables and their unobservable characteristics.
But once more, the argument doesn’t carry conviction. Note first 
that, if Chalmers’s construction of virtual objects and properties 
works (cf. VR-M-1), it does so for unobservable objects as it does for 
observable ones: We may regard the objects as data structures and 
say that they are constituted by certain processes in the computer 
that realize computations referring to the objects. There is indeed no 
difference in the way in which observable and unobservable entities 
are dealt with in computer simulations.
Note also that it would be narrow-minded to restrict virtual real-
ism to objects that have visible counterparts. After all, many people 
(at least scientific realists) don’t restrict things to observables, so why 
do this with virtual objects?
Nor is there anything that prevents us from applying Chalmers’s 
understanding of properties (cf. VR-M-2) to unobservable charac-
teristics. That unobservable entities have some such characteristics 
leanings may simply ask: Why is it legitimate to use this vocabulary and to take 
it at face value, viz. as referring to unobservables? Hacking can only convince 
anti-realists using his criterion if he can mount an independent case for using this 
vocabulary and for taking it literally. But this brings us back to other arguments in 
favor of scientific realism, and thus, the possibility of interaction does not suffice 
as an independent argument for scientific realism. If my argument above is cor-
rect, the possibility of interaction doesn’t make a decisive difference for virtual 
realism, either.
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can even be made visible using standard visualization techniques.10 
For instance, that a certain agglomeration of quarks has a particular 
shape can be visualized by showing the shape like the one of a visible 
object. The simulated agglomeration thus has the power to produce 
shape-like appearances in the headset, which is to say that it has a 
certain virtual shape, at least if we assume Chalmers’s understand-
ing of virtual shapes. Recall also that Chalmers allows at least some 
virtual properties to be identified in terms of their roles they play 
in the virtual world. Color charges and similar unobservable char-
acteristics of quarks do play specific roles in respective computer 
simulations.
As far as perception and VR-E are concerned, we can argue as fol-
lows: In some simulations with unobservable objects, these objects 
are in fact visualized. So we can say that the virtual objects can be 
perceived. It is of course true that the perception of virtual objects 
is somehow special. For instance, spatial patterns with characteristic 
lengths significantly smaller than the wavelength of visible light do 
not have parts with different colors. Nevertheless, in a visualization, 
the parts of the pattern are most naturally marked by different col-
ors. So the visualization is in some sense deceptive. But experienced 
users of the visualizations will know about this problem. They will 
thus not be deceived, but rather understand that the colors are just 
representational means to communicate the spatial pattern. In cases 
of other simulations in which unobservable entities and their unob-
servable properties are not visualized, we may say that non-illusory 
perception of them qua virtual objects is at least possible because 
there are standard means to visualize them. Also, as I have argued 
above, it is not part of Chalmers’s virtual realism that virtual objects 
must be perceived.
This shows not only that all kinds of computer simulations fea-
ture virtual objects. It also makes clear that many virtual environ-
ments contain more objects than one may think. If Tina’s virtual 
environment is based upon a computer program in which e.g. the air 
10 Check e.g. http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/theory/staff/leinweber/
VisualQCD/Nobel/index.html (last checked June 11, 2019) for visualizations of 
simulations based upon quantum chromodynamics, which is the theory about 
strong interactions between quarks.
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molecules are traced, then the virtual environment contains virtual 
molecules. It would be at least as unnatural to exclude them from 
being virtual objects as it is to deny the existence of real unobserv-
able objects such as real molecules. In fact, certain skeptical worries 
about underdetermination that one may have in view of our knowl-
edge of unobservable entities are inappropriate here. For, if a com-
puter simulation traces the behavior of certain unobservable entities, 
this is encoded in the simulation program. There are thus matters of 
fact about what virtual air consists of, and they can be known by ana-
lyzing the computer program. It is thus not sensible to worry about 
the possibility that virtual air may be made out of entirely different 
stuff and that the unobservable virtual reality is beyond our grasp.
A fourth and final difference between at least some scientific 
simulations and virtual environments is that the former are based 
upon highly idealized models. For instance, in some multi-agent 
simulations, agents are represented only using a utility function for 
a particular choice and a spatial location (think of Schelling’s famous 
model for segregation and related implementations on the computer; 
see e.g. Schelling 1969). This is certainly not enough information to 
produce an image showing an agent. One may thus think that e.g. 
agents in multi-agent simulations are too poor to be virtual objects.
But once more, this would put an unnatural restriction on virtual 
objects. In virtual environments, many objects are only traced using 
few characteristics too. Further, the number of characteristics of an 
unobservable object that are traced in a computer program can often 
be chosen from a broad range of options. It seems arbitrary to draw a 
line and to say that some objects traced by computer programs form 
virtual objects, while others do not because they have too few charac-
teristics. As a consequence, we should accept „poor“ virtual objects.
It is true that the idealized agents in multi-agent simulations are 
not virtual human beings because, in virtual reality, virtual humans 
have to fulfill exactly the roles that humans fulfill in reality, and 
idealized agents do not do so (cf. Chalmers’s draft, Sec 4, p. 14). But 
this does not imply that the agents are not virtual objects.
All this shows that the differences between scientific computer 
simulations and virtual environments are insignificant for the jus-
tification of virtual realism. Thus, if virtual realism is on the right 
track for virtual reality environments and if Chalmers’s construal 
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of virtual objects and their properties makes sense, it carries over 
to simulated objects from scientific computer simulations. Chalmers 
does in fact say that computer simulations are behind virtual reality 
(2017: 313), and it is natural to apply virtual realism to all sorts of 
computer simulations and the objects figuring in them.
Now at first sight, all this may not seem bad news for virtual re-
alism. For doesn’t it mean that the position has broad scope? But 
at closer analysis, the prospects of virtual realism become bleaker, 
when we consider the extensions I have conditionally proposed. The 
reason is that, intuitively speaking, it seems implausible to think that 
all sorts of simulated objects really exist. For one thing, there are so 
many simulations with so many simulated entities, and do we want to 
admit so many real things in our ontology? For another thing, what 
figures in a simulation is often quite remote from reality and highly 
idealized. We have particles devoid of any extension, massless levers 
and what have you. Should we really say that these things all exist?
3.2. Dealing with an objection
Chalmers may object that there is nothing problematic if e.g. simu-
lated galaxies too are virtual objects, and thus, according to virtual 
realism, real entities. To this purpose, he may argue that I appeal to 
intuitions that are ultimately misguided. He may also try to defend 
his position by pointing out that virtual realism adds only commit-
ments to virtual objects.
But such an objection wouldn’t work. To begin with the last 
point, note that, for Chalmers, virtual objects are indeed real ob-
jects, because virtual means “computer-generated” and not just “as 
if, but not really existing” (cf. 2017: 311). Some opponents of virtual 
realism deny that virtual cats are real objects. So virtual realism does 
lead to a proliferation of objects in comparison to other positions.
Note further that my argument is not only based upon intuitions. 
Rather, I appeal to an important theoretical virtue: Ceteris paribus, 
a theory is preferred to another one if it postulates fewer entities than 
the latter. Now, as we have just seen, virtual realism, as defined by 
Chalmers, does claim that there are entities the existence of which 
is denied by other parties. This proliferation of things is a pro tanto 
reason to reject virtual realism. This reason may be outweighed by 
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other reasons; e.g. if virtual realism can explain things that other 
positions fail to explain, or if it explains things much better than 
do other positions. But it is doubtful whether virtual realism does 
so. What virtual objects can possibly explain are (i) virtual events 
and (ii) the experiences of objects and of events on the part of users. 
But it is controversial between virtual realists and their opponents 
whether there are any virtual events, so we have to bracket their ex-
planation. The experiences of objects and of events on the part of the 
users may be explained in alternative ways too, for instance by point-
ing to processes in the hardware and the headset. It may be objected 
that this explanation is less appealing and more complicated than an 
explanation in terms of virtual objects. Even if this is correct, it is far 
from clear that related benefits in an explanation in terms of virtual 
realism outweigh the costs of proliferating things.
As far as intuition is concerned, we can back up intuitions that 
resist the proliferation of objects, when we compare computer simu-
lations to other applications of computers. Computer programs too 
are used to evaluate integrals, to determine roots of functions etc. 
Now from a computational perspective, the computations underly-
ing such applications and underlying computer simulations are not 
very different. Likewise, from a physical perspective, there isn’t 
much of a difference. When we consider the physical processes in a 
computer hardware, it is extremely difficult to tell whether a simula-
tion is run or whether a different computation is carried out. Even 
as far as visualization is concerned, there need not be much of a dif-
ference; some algorithms that aim at identifying a root of a function 
can be used to produce animations too. This faces virtual realists 
with a dilemma: They either allow for even further virtual objects 
(e.g. virtual roots), which seems even more implausible (what kinds 
of objects are virtual roots?). Alternatively, they draw a line between 
computer simulations and other uses of the computer and only allow 
that the former give rise to virtual objects. But this seems like draw-
ing an artificial distinction.
The latter point may be seen by considering an interesting border-
line case, viz. a computer-based calculation that may be interpreted 
as a simulation, but is in fact not regarded to be one. For instance, a 
Monte Carlo integration that is supposed to return the value of some 
area may be interpreted in terms of a real process in which a person 
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throws little objects, say pebbles, on the area and its surroundings, 
but is usually not interpreted in this way (cf. Buffon’s needle experi-
ment; see Grüne-Yanoff and Weirich 2010: 29–30 for a discussion). 
Are there then virtual objects thrown on an area according to virtual 
realism? However we answer this question, a problem for virtual 
realism arises. If the answer is yes, what prevents us from obtaining 
more and more virtual objects simply because we can tell stories 
around all kinds of computations done by a computer? If the answer 
is no, then it depends on the way a computer program is understood 
by the user (e.g. the working scientist) whether there are virtual ob-
jects or not. But it seems weird that the existence of virtual objects 
turns on the view of the user.
Chalmers may try a slightly different route to object against my 
point that virtual realism leads to an undue proliferation of things. 
He may want to argue that even a rival, fictionalist position does 
not avoid the proliferation of things. After all, isn’t it the case that 
fictionalists have to admit the existence of e.g. virtual cats in some 
sense too?
To show that this is wrong, I’ll consider a specific form of 
ficitionalism about virtual objects (such a position is proposed by 
McDonnell and Wildman, forthcoming in this volume). The idea is 
that virtual objects are parts of a Waltonian game of make-believe 
(Walton 1990). To understand this, consider first Walton’s famous 
example of a game of make-believe (which does not yet involve 
computers; 1990: 21–8): Children agree that stumps in a wood count 
as bears in a game. Depending on what is true about the stumps, we 
obtain fictional truths about bears, e.g. that there are about 30 bears 
in the wood etc. For Walton, the stumps are so-called props (1990: 
37–8). They help to grant truths in the fiction. What we need for 
this account, ontologically speaking, are props, but not bears and no 
bear-like objects apart from the props.
If we wish to apply this view to objects from virtual reality envi-
ronments and computer simulations, we can say that they form part 
of a game of make-believe that arises because people are prepared to 
treat certain props as virtual cats, simulated galaxies etc. A natural 
suggestion in this respect is that the computer-generated images of 
virtual cats and simulated galaxies act as props. Alternatively, we 
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may consider certain processes in the hardware as props.11 In either 
case, the props are real-world objects that exist in the world anyway. 
Virtual realists and their fictionalist opponents agree that there are 
e.g. cat-like images on the screen. Virtual realists claim that there 
are additional objects, viz. virtual cats that explain the images on the 
screen. Fictionalists, by contrast, deny that there are any other real 
objects apart from the props. So virtual realists are committed to 
the existence of objects that Waltonian fictionalists deny. Of course, 
fictionalists must say that some objects are not just objects, but also 
props. But this does not enrich the ontology. It’s simply to say that 
certain things are treated in a particular way. So at least certain 
types of fictionalism can do with fewer objects than virtual realism.
All in all, the objection that the proliferation of objects implied by 
virtual realism isn’t problematic does not carry conviction. Virtual 
realism does postulate more entities than do other positions, and this 
is a problem, among other things because parsimony is a theoretical 
virtue.
3.3 Using the parallel with computer simulation 
Granted that virtual environment technologies and computer simu-
lations are very similar, we can use the parallel to import insights 
from the philosophy of computer simulation to the philosophical 
analysis of virtual reality environments. In what follows, I’ll sketch a 
view of what the status of simulated galaxies etc. is. This suggests an 
alternative to Chalmers’s virtual realism. It also puts some pressure 
on the latter because a natural position about the status of simulated 
objects is quite different from Chalmers’s position.
It is a commonplace in the literature about computer simulations 
(see e.g. Humphreys 2004: ch. 5 and Winsberg 2010 for pioneering 
accounts) that they are closely associated with models. In fact, “to 
simulate” means roughly “to model”. Also, many computer simula-
tions are based upon prior models, e.g. the so-called Ising model. 
Further, each simulation can be said to implement a model.
Modeling is a research strategy with distinctive characteristics 
11 It is less problematic to treat a process as an object in a game of make-
believe than to claim that a process is an object.
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(e.g. Suárez 2004, Weisberg 2007). The strategy is to not investi-
gate a target system directly, but rather to first consider a substitute, 
which is often called source or simply model, to analyze the latter 
and to translate the findings from the model to the target. This is 
certainly true of two broad classes of paradigmatic models, viz. ma-
terial models, e.g. scale models of cars, and ictional models, i.e., imag-
ined systems such as a system with point particles that interact with 
each other via Newtonian gravity. Note that these types of models 
are distinguished in terms of the ontological status of their sources. 
Note also that the term “fictional model” needs to be understood 
with some care. The idea here is not that fictional models function 
like fictions in every respect. The point is rather that they are merely 
imagined systems which “would be concrete if they were real” (see 
e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2006: 734–5 for this formulation) and which are 
used to study a target.
Sometimes, other sorts of things, e.g. viewgraphs or mathemati-
cal equations with an empirical interpretation, are called models too. 
But viewgraphs and equations immediately depict or describe (real 
or imagined) systems. If they depict or describe the target system (at 
least to some approximation), then they do not really instantiate the 
indirect research strategy characteristic of other types of modeling. 
If they describe a system distinct from the target system, the latter 
is used as a surrogate of the target system, so they depict or de-
scribe a model of the target. We should then call the viewgraphs and 
the equations “model descriptions” and differentiate them from the 
models themselves (see Weisberg 2007: 217 for this distinction).12
When computer scientists describe their simulations, they are 
typically talking about their model. They talk e.g. about dark matter 
particles, about the galaxies they form and so on. The crucial ques-
tion now is what ontological status these objects have. Since models 
are classified according to the ontological status of the source, the 
question is: What type of model is associated with a simulation (see 
Beisbart 2014 for the following)? Clearly, the objects do not form 
12 The distinction between models and model descriptions is not uncontro-
versial; nor is the claim that equations are not models, strictly speaking. But in 
what follows, the argument does not hinge on the assumption that equations are 
not really models. What I assume though is that animations from computer simu-
lations are model descriptions. This seems plausible.
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a material model because nothing physical like a galaxy is involved 
in the simulation. Rather, if the equations that the simulations try 
to solve to some approximation refer to a system distinct from the 
target (e.g. because the equations are based upon so many idealiza-
tions that they cannot refer to the target directly), they describe a 
fictional model of the target. This suggests that the simulated cosmic 
structures etc. are part of a fictional model, i.e., a merely imagined 
system, and that we are not talking about real objects. This is very 
natural because a lot of simulations are in fact built upon prior mod-
els that certainly are fictional or imagined systems, e.g. spins distrib-
uted in a two-dimensional grid in an Ising-type model.
It may be objected that there are different cases of simulations 
in which the equations solved by the simulations directly yield a de-
scription of a real target. But if there are such cases, there is no need 
to refer to any object beyond the target, and we can bracket such 
simulations in what follows. The point then stands that all kinds of 
simulations are well analyzed without postulating a layer of separate, 
but non-fictional simulated objects.13
But there is a complication for the simulations that primarily re-
fer to an imagined system. It is plausible to say that each simulation 
of this type is not just associated with one model, but rather with 
several ones (cf. Winsberg 2001). The reason is that scientists often 
start with a prior model independent from the simulation. To obtain 
approximate solutions using the computer simulations, the scien-
tists have to modify the model. For instance, if the dynamics of the 
source is described in terms of differential equations, the equations 
need to be discretized. This is naturally captured by saying that the 
model is changed. If the simulation program is run on a hardware, 
additional deviations from the original model can arise, for instance, 
round-off errors are incurred during floating point operations. We 
may conceptualize this by saying that, what has really been solved, is 
a yet different model, call it the computational model (cf. Schlesinger 
et al. 1979). So we obtain a series of models. Clearly, all of them have 
13 Note that there are intermediate cases between the types of simulations just 
distinguished: A computer simulation may refer to a real system but consider it 
under very counterfactual circumstances or mix it with unrealistic stuff (2017: 
344–6). For the purposes of this paper, we can handle such cases as we do with 
the first class of simulations.
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the same status, and they must all be fictional models if some of them 
are such, as suggested above.
A virtual realist à la Chalmers will have to pick one of the models 
and to say that its objects are real, that the latter really instantiate 
properties etc. She will most likely choose the computational model 
because this is the model that really produces the outputs.
From the perspective of the discussion about computer simula-
tions, then, what Chalmers essentially does is to say that objects in 
some (viz. computational) fictional models are real because the mod-
els are implemented on a computer and because they produce output 
accessible to the senses. This is quite unnatural given that there are 
often other models associated with a computer simulation. Further, 
what’s the point of claiming that the objects in some simulation re-
ally exist qua digital objects?
To summarize this section, the upshot is first that, if virtual real-
ism holds true, it should be applied to computer simulations, too. 
Intuitively, this goes some way towards a reductio: We do not want 
to allow for so many objects, especially “poor” ones, as familiar from 
fictional models. The literature about computer simulations indeed 
suggests an alternative picture: If computer simulations do not di-
rectly refer to the real world, they refer to fictional systems. Simulat-
ed cosmic structures etc. are fictional systems used to understand a 
target. What the computer simulation does is to deliver handy model 
descriptions. Philosophers of science have to allow for such model 
descriptions anyway if they want to make sense of the practice of 
modeling. So why say that the imagined objects are real simply be-
cause there are handy descriptions and nice pictures of them?
All this does not show that virtual realism is false. But it casts 
some doubts on it and suggests that something might have gone 
wrong with the way in which Chalmers has constructed the posi-
tion. In what follows, I will elaborate this diagnosis by analyzing the 
steps with which Chalmers builds up virtual realism. I’ll take the 
metaphysical and epistemic components of the position one after the 
other, and analyze the support they have. The main gist of my criti-
cism is that Chalmers allows himself to construct a realist position 
too easily by a number of problematic moves.
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4 Realism easy-going
4.1 Virtual objects (VR-M1)
Chalmers starts with objects. The first claim within his realism holds 
that virtual objects really exist, and his defense of virtual realism 
starts from objects too (2017: 317). But what does it mean to say that 
virtual objects such as avatars really exist? In philosophical circles, 
there has been increasing concern about claims about unrestricted 
existence. Quine (1948) identifies objects relative to theories only. 
More recently, Putnam (2002) has argued that ontology is ill-con-
ceived if it is supposed to find out what objects there really are. There 
is no unique way to identify objects, and questions of the sort “How 
many objects are there in this-and-this realm?” can only meaning-
fully be answered, if he have agreed upon a restricted sense of there 
being objects—e.g. qua fundamental material particles. Consider 
now a paradigmatic fictional entity such as Sherlock Holmes. Does 
he exist? Well, in some way he does, in others not. Presumably, the 
same is true about objects in virtual reality or simulations. Just to 
insist that virtual objects exist doesn’t mean much.
Now Chalmers has a lot more to say about virtual objects. In par-
ticular, he claims them to be digital objects. To some approximation, 
which will suffice for our purposes, the latter “can be regarded as 
data structures” (2017: 317). Further, for Chalmers, digital objects 
are “constituted by computational processes on a computer” and “are 
grounded in computational processes” (ibid.). But does this answer 
the question of what digital objects really are?
Turn first to the claim that digital, and thus virtual, objects are, 
roughly speaking, data structures. In the literature about program-
ming, “data structure” is a technical term roughly referring to ways 
of organizing data; for instance, queues and stacks are well-known 
data structures (see e.g. Brass 2008: xi). Data structures in this sense 
arise most naturally at the level of a computer program. But pro-
grams are ultimately sets of instructions and thus abstract objects. 
They do not have causal powers and thus cannot form objects with 
causal powers. So Chalmers is presumably more interested in some-
thing like the following. In a computer simulation (be it one that 
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underlies virtual reality technology or a scientific simulation), ob-
jects are traced using characteristics, e.g. position, mass, color etc. 
When the simulation program is executed, the characteristics take 
values that change with time. The computer hardware is used to 
store and further process the values. This means that, for a specific 
state of the hardware at some time, there is something about the 
hardware that corresponds to the fact that the characteristics of the 
object (position, mass, color) take such and such values. This is the 
basis on which digital objects must be constructed.
The problem now is that, at the level of the hardware, it is dif-
ficult to identify anything object-like that may properly be regarded 
as digital (and thus virtual) object. The computer is built up of pro-
cessors, which sequentially store and process information about vari-
ous characteristics traced by the computer program. On all-purpose 
machines, there are typically relatively few processors, and none of 
them is exclusively reserved for the numbers that trace one particular 
object in the simulation. The only way to link virtual objects with 
the computer hardware is to say that certain aspects of the computer 
state, or, maybe, of the dynamics of the computer hardware corre-
spond to the object. But does this tell us what the virtual objects are? 
Can we identify the virtual objects with those aspects? To say that ob-
jects are aspects of states or processes sounds like a category mistake.
The background to this problem is as follows. A computer simu-
lation can be described at various levels (Barberousse et al. 2009). 
To characterize a simulation, we can use a fictional model, the math-
ematical equations to be solved, the algorithm, the program or the 
physical processes during which the program is executed. We can 
easily identify objects like cats at the top level (i.e., the fictional 
model). But to obtain physical objects with causal powers that can be 
digital objects and produce e.g. appearances of colors, Chalmers has 
to move to the lowest layer of physical reality. Now the relationship 
between this layer and the top layer is very complicated. The reason 
is that the bottom layer realizes a computation that solves equations 
that in turn describe the virtual cat or whatever it is. As Barber-
ousse et al. (2009: 563) point out, the relationship is semantic. Cer-
tain physical processes are interpreted as doing calculations due to 
conventional mappings between aspects of hardware states and the 
fictional model. For this reason, the relationship cannot be easily 
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described in purely physical terms. Since there is no mapping that 
is cast in simple physical terms and that connects the fiction and the 
computer hardware, we cannot identify counterparts of the fictional 
objects in plain physics terms. But this means that there are no such 
object-like counterparts in the physical world, for we would have to 
carve them out using simple physics terminology, which is tuned to 
what we take to be physical objects.
It may be objected that virtual realists don’t need physical ob-
jects to make sense of virtual objects qua digital objects. But why 
then insist that there are virtual objects which are supposed to be 
digital objects with causal powers, if we can just say that there is an 
extremely complicated relationship between the fictional objects and 
some physical stuff?
Now apart from roughly identifying virtual objects with data struc-
tures, Chalmers also proposes to say that virtual objects are grounded in, 
or constituted by, computational processes. This is significantly weaker 
than any identification of virtual objects with computational processes 
or whatever. And it seems less of a problem to say that objects are 
grounded, or constituted by, computational processes (although the 
idea that processes constitute an object sounds still a bit strange).
The problem though is that claims about grounding or the con-
stitution of objects do not answer the question of what the objects 
are. To know what certain objects are we should at least be given the 
category they belong to as well as some of their essential features or 
at least the types of features they must essentially have. For instance, 
when the first atomists claimed that the material world was made out 
of little invisible particles, they could say that these particles were 
material bodies, and they could provide determinable features the 
particles would have (e.g. mass).14 They could also point out analo-
gies to the observable world (e.g. to little balls). Chalmers’s virtual 
realism, by contrast, strikes me as poor on these counts. He doesn’t 
really specify the category of virtual objects. He does provide fea-
tures that virtual objects can have, but they are all virtual properties. 
Appeal to such properties is not very promising because the question 
14 Today, there is of course a real issue of what particles like electrons etc. re-
ally are because they are quantum-mechanical objects and because quantum me-
chanics is so difficult to interpret. This is why my example is about early atomism.
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of whether there are such properties is part of the debate on virtual 
realism. It is true that properties like virtual color are explained in 
terms of analogies. But the problem is that all virtual properties to 
which Chalmers appeals are ultimately defined in terms of their ef-
fects. This means that describing these properties doesn’t really get 
us closer to the virtual objects themselves.15
To strengthen my case, let me recall what the dialectical situation 
is like. Chalmers claims that there is a layer of virtual objects, while 
other authors deny that layer. Now to say that the supposed objects 
are grounded in, or constituted by, something else doesn’t really add 
to the plausibility of the position.16
All in all, I conclude that Chalmers’s virtual realism is too cheap 
because he doesn’t have a satisfying answer to the question of what 
digital, and thus virtual, objects are. An identification of virtual ob-
jects with data structures doesn’t work, and what he has to say about 
the constitution or grounding of virtual objects falls short of answer-
ing the question of what the objects really are.17
15 It may be claimed that there is in fact a good analogy as follows: Virtual 
objects arise from the hardware of a computer in the same way as mental states 
arise from the brain. But the relationship between the brain and mental states is 
not well understood. Also, at the level of the mental, many authors do not as-
sume there to be mental objects (rather, they prefer mental states or processes), 
while virtual realism needs objects. Note further that there is a strong epistemic 
disanalogy between both cases: Whereas we know that there are mental states, 
the existence of virtual objects is disputed. We have thus no worries to admit that 
there are mental states, simply because we know about them. By contrast, virtual 
realism would have to show that there are virtual objects.
16 Kripke (1980: 110–3) argues that, for some objects (e.g. the Queen, this 
wooden table), their origin is essential to them. If this is true about artifacts, the 
origin of an individual artifact is at least part of its identity. Likewise, the origin of 
a virtual object may be part of its identity. If this is true, then specifying the way 
in which a virtual object is grounded goes some way to explaining what this object 
is. The question though is whether it goes far enough. The specification of some 
essential features of an object doesn’t necessarily tell us what this object (or its es-
sence) is simply because there may be additional essential properties. Note also that 
Kripke is concerned with individual objects. Our concern, by contrast, is a whole 
class of objects (virtual objects). If it is not clear what these objects are, it does not 
much help to assert that they essentially have a certain type of origin or grounding. 
17 In this special issue, McDonnell and Wildman (forthcoming) face Chalmers 
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4.2 Virtual properties and their instantiation (VR-M2)
Turn now to virtual properties and their (virtual?) instantiation. In 
the Petrus Hispanus Lectures, we find two slightly different strands 
in the characterization of virtual properties. First, virtual colors and 
virtual spatial properties are, roughly speaking, claimed to be dispo-
sitions to produce impressions of colors and spatial properties under 
the conditions typical of virtual reality (2017: 321–3). Virtual prop-
erties of this type would have to qualify as secondary qualities be-
cause their specification refers to the way we know of them. As such, 
they arguably violate the independence claim constitutive of many 
brands of realism requiring that the domain of things under consid-
eration be mind-independent or objective (see e.g. Wright 1993: 1–2 
and Psillos 1999: 12–3 for the independence dimension of realism; 
whether, and to what extent, secondary qualities really violate the 
independence part of realism is admittedly a tricky question).
Second, Chalmers characterizes at least some virtual proper-
ties more generally in terms of the roles they take in virtual reality. 
For instance, virtual shapes are said to fulfill the same role that real 
shapes have in the real world (2017: 323–4). This idea may be gener-
alized to virtual properties with no counterparts in the non-virtual 
world by saying that they have distinctive roles to play in virtual real-
ity (cf. 2017: 349). Note though that this characterization does not 
coincide with the first one, if we focus on colors. According to the 
first characterization, reactions of users are decisive for virtual colors. 
But if virtual colors play the same functional role in virtual reality 
as colors do in reality, then they would have to produce impressions 
in virtual humans, which is something else (and which they don’t do 
unless virtual humans have consciousness), and do a couple of other 
things (viz. produce those effects in the virtual world that real colors 
have in the real world).
A more significant worry is that Chalmers obtains virtual proper-
ties and their instantiation too cheap. To say that virtual properties 
are dispositions to produce certain impressions or that they fulfill 
with a similar theoretical dilemma: Chalmers has either to identify virtual objects 
with digital objects or to claim a weaker dependency relation. McDonnell and 
Wildman argue that both options are not attractive, but give different reasons.
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certain roles isn’t informative enough. To take up the first strand 
of thinking about properties, it is of course true that the hardware 
underlying a virtual reality environment produces impressions of 
e.g. (virtually) gray (virtual) cats, but Chalmers has to show how the 
instantiation of a virtual property by a virtual object produces the impres-
sion. Chalmers faces a tough challenge to explain this because it is 
already unclear what a virtual object really is. At some point (2017: 
322), he appeals to an entry in a data structure, but this does not suf-
fice since data structures and their entries are abstract objects that 
do not have causal powers.
Likewise, to take up the second strand of thinking, it is true that 
all sorts of roles can be distinguished at the level of e.g. virtual cats. 
But Chalmers is a virtual digitalist, so he has to show how these roles 
emerge from the level of the digital objects, and thus roughly from 
the physical processes running in the hardware. The problem here is 
once more that there is a huge gap between describing the computer 
simulation in terms of physical processes (and digital objects) and 
in terms of the simulated reality (roles in the virtual environment).
Chalmers may object that I’m requiring too much and that I ex-
pect a reductionistic characterization of virtual objects and their 
properties, while, as we all know, reductions are hard to obtain. 
However, such an objection does not seem legitimate. It is Chalmers 
who wants to say that virtual objects are real, and not just fictions, 
because they are digital objects that are somehow part of physical 
reality. If the computer processes in the hardware are decisive for 
there being objects of a certain kind (digital and thus virtual objects), 
it should be clear how the objects arise from the hardware and its 
processes, and likewise with properties. If this is not explained, it 
seems more natural to say that the computer delivers animations of 
fictional objects.
4.3 Epistemic access (VR-E)
Turn now to epistemic access to virtual worlds. Chalmers thinks 
that there is non-illusory perception of virtual objects. Now if vir-
tual objects are digital objects, then users of VR techniques would 
have to observe digital objects. But can we say that digital objects are 
observed? Let’s grant for the sake of argument that there are digital 
Claus Beisbart324
objects and that they are some proximate causes of the appearances 
on the part of the user. This is not enough to claim that the digital 
objects are perceived. For this to be the case, the appearances should 
also represent the digital objects, e.g. by being similar to them or in 
some other way. But the appearances of virtual objects do not resem-
ble digital objects, if the latter are computer processes or something 
like this. And even most experienced users of VR know too little 
about the computer hardware as to be able to take the appearances 
to be representations of digital objects.18
Moreover, the claim that experienced VR users have non-illusory 
experiences of digital objects is established too quickly. The essential 
trick is to say that experienced VR users have an appropriate con-
ception of the objects they have appearances of. They are supposed 
to think of them as virtual objects. But it now seems that virtual 
realism gets off the ground too easily. Chalmers starts from the cat-
impressions etc. produced by some VR technology. He tells us that 
cat-impressions correspond to real objects, viz. virtual cats, by ap-
pealing to parts of the computer hardware that are causally respon-
sible for the impressions. He grants that the cat-impressions can be 
illusions but assures us that they are not, if the epistemic agent (the 
user) has the correct attitude, viz. takes the impressions to refer to 
virtual objects. But this recipe can easily be extended to other cases: 
Point to the causal history of perceptual or likewise states, postulate 
objects that figure in this history and claim that we do really have 
epistemic access to those objects, if we interpret the perceptions in 
an appropriate way, i.e., in terms of the objects just postulated.
This very trick can be applied to sorts of fiction, for instance. 
Suppose that children are playing and assuming that stumps that are 
in the shadow are bears (I here adapt the example from Walton 1990: 
21–8). Following the recipe just given, we can construct a realism 
according to which some sorts of bears exist. These sorts of bears are 
stumps in the shadow. They are perceived in a non-illusory manner 
18 Note that this argument does not assume a similarity account of representa-
tion. It only presupposes that a representation is used to learn something about the 
object that is represented (cf. Suárez 2004). This condition is violated if digital, and 
thus virtual, objects are something in the hardware about which the user does not 
know much. Then she cannot use the images of the virtual cat etc. to learn more 
about digital objects (see Beisbart 2018: 181–6 for a more detailed argument).
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when children see the stumps and interpret them as bears. But it 
seems odd to construct a realism about what seems to be part of a fic-
tion if realism is supposed to say that virtual objects are not fictions.
4.4 Fictions
This brings us to a more general point about fictions and fictionalism. 
Chalmers insists that virtual objects are not fictions (see in particu-
lar 2017: 316–7) and contrasts his realism with fictionalism (2017: 
315–7). Note first that it is not the same to say that some range of 
things R are part of a fiction and to advocate fictionalism about the 
corresponding domain of discourse. The reason is that most variet-
ies of fictionalism about a domain do not claim that R is part of a 
fiction. True, fictionalism is often loosely characterized as claiming 
that something we talk about is a sort of fiction (e.g. Eklund 2017, 
introduction). But this is at most a first pass at fictionalism. A more 
precise characterization of the common core of fictionalism is the 
claim that a certain discourse is not, or is not meant to be, featuring 
literal truths (ibid.). This does not imply that it engages in fiction-
telling, literally speaking.
Consider now first the view that virtual objects are literally part 
of a fiction. In the philosophical literature about fiction, it is debat-
ed whether fictional characters exist or not (see Koon and Voltolini 
2016). Some authors think that they do. So to say that virtual objects 
are fictions is not to claim that they are not real. It is thus possible 
to say that virtual cats etc. are parts of fictions and at the same time 
digital objects. True, the most common views about what fictional 
characters and objects are, i.e., possibilism, Meinongian views and 
creationism (ibid.), do not take fictions to be part of the material 
world (as are presumably Chalmers’s digital objects). But we may 
then read Chalmers’s position as a new way of spelling out what fic-
tional objects can be—at least for some such objects, i.e., those gen-
erated in terms of virtual reality technologies.19
19 Chalmers (2017: 334–7) concedes that some virtual reality environments 
are associated with a fiction. He further admits that all virtual reality environ-
ments can be associated with a fiction. So he would to some extent agree with my 
claim that his virtual realism is compatible with the view that virtual objects are 
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Turn now to fictionalism. There are various types of fictionalism, 
which differ in the way in which they assign truth conditions to state-
ments from a domain of discourse that is interpreted in a fictionalist 
vein. One of them is object fictionalism (Yablo 2001: 76–8). The 
rough idea is that a statement from the discourse has a literal, but 
false content F. But there is a non-literal, but possibly correct thing 
to say with the statement, and this is that things are such that, ac-
cording to the rules constitutive of the fiction, F is true. The crucial 
facts to which Chalmers refers in order to justify his virtual realism 
can be used to establish a type of object fictionalism. The rules of the 
fiction have it that cat-appearances are to be treated as representa-
tions of objects. The processes in the computer then make it the case 
that, according to the fiction, the cat is e.g. gray.
What this shows is that the crucial facts to which Chalmers refers 
lend themselves to a fictionalist interpretation. But then his realism 
and fictionalism are not very far apart.
4.5 Virtual worlds?
When talking about virtual environments, Chalmers speaks of virtual 
worlds. Such talk sounds impressive. But at closer inspection, virtual 
worlds are rather poor and to some extent strange. To finish my argu-
ment, I’ll briefly look at some ways in which virtual worlds are so.
First, depending on the level of detail that is covered by a com-
puter simulation, virtual worlds can be very poor. If only the din-
ing room is simulated, there is nothing but the dining room in this 
world. If the simulation doesn’t resolve what’s in the cupboard, then 
the cupboard is empty. If some period of time wasn’t simulated, then 
there was no such time.
parts of fictions. But Chalmers thinks that in either case the digital objects have 
priority over the (possible) parts of the fiction because it is not necessary to inter-
pret the virtual objects in terms of a fiction. This is sensible if we can be sure that 
there are virtual objects qua digital objects that are independent of any fiction. But 
I have above raised doubts about the existence of virtual objects. At this point, I can 
add the following observation: The problem about Chalmers‘s construal of digital, 
and thus virtual, objects is that some merely imagined, or fictional characters (e.g. 
the virtual cat) are somehow projected in the material structure of the computer 
hardware. This suggests that the fiction is neither optional nor secondary.
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Second, again depending on the level of detail that is simulated, 
virtual worlds can be indeterminate in many ways. They leave ques-
tions open that we may raise about them. There is no fact of the 
matter that determines the answer. For instance, what virtual stuff 
are the tables, chairs etc. made of? Are they wooden or made out of 
plastic? If a table is just modeled as a rigid body (which is a sensible 
option), then there is no answer to this question.
Questions that are particularly interesting in this respect concern 
the identity of particulars. Suppose, for instance, that the cat dis-
appears from the dining room and a cat with the same properties 
comes back. Or suppose that Tina stops the simulation at some point 
and later starts it again. Is Tina dealing with the same cat or not? To 
be sure, according to Chalmers, we can assume that we are prop-
erly talking of virtual cats, because the virtual cats fulfill the roles 
that cats fulfill in the real world. But how are particulars identified 
through time using the simulations? If virtual objects are digital ob-
jects, as Chalmers thinks, then the question is how we can identify 
digital objects through time. Even if we assume that Chalmers can 
specify what digital objects are, it’s not clear to me how to identify 
individual objects through time. Suppose, for instance, that a certain 
type of process in a computer hardware is decisive for the there be-
ing a virtual cat. If such a process is stopped because the simulation 
is interrupted and if the simulation is later resumed, are we talking 
about two processes? Or the same process?
Third, virtual worlds are not homogeneous, metaphysically 
speaking. What happens in a virtual world is partly determined by 
causes operating in the virtual world (virtual cats and the like), but 
partly also by agents outside the virtual world (e.g. Tina). Note in 
this respect that Tina is not a virtual object for Chalmers since she 
is not a digital object (unless we all live in a computer simulation). 
Likewise, there is an inhomogeneity regarding events: Most of them 
are digital events in that they only involve digital objects and their 
properties. But a few events that are naturally counted as part of the 
virtual world, e.g. Tina’s decision to pet the cat are not virtual events 
(cf. 2017: 344).20
20 I take it that this is at least part of the reason why VR-M2 is qualified with 
a “largely” (2017: 311).
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Fourth, to the extent to which facts in the virtual world stretch, 
they are not evidence-transcendent for human beings. The reason is 
that, for Chalmers, ultimately processes in the computer hardware 
determine what happens in the virtual world. This type of fact can 
in principle be known by humans.21
Fifth, there are some interesting problems about time in a virtual 
world. Take two arbitrary events in a simulation that is not inter-
rupted (things become of course even more difficult if there is an 
interruption). What is the time interval between them? There is not 
just one way to answer this question. A first answer is provided by 
the time it takes the simulation to get from one event to the other. 
A potentially different answer arises when time is simulated e.g. in 
terms of clocks. Time may “run faster” in the simulation, because, 
in the animation, it takes only half an hour until the pointer of a vir-
tual clock has moved from 7 to 8 o’clock. Which then is the correct 
period of time?
Conclusion
Where does our discussion leave us? Can we use Chalmers’s virtual 
realism to convince Tina that she has obtained a real object not too 
dissimilar from a cat? Is it a sensible position?
I have first argued that, if it is sound, the virtual digitalist brand 
of virtual realism should be applied to all sorts of computer simula-
tions. There would thus really be virtual galaxies etc. in scientific 
computer simulations. This produces a slippery slope for virtual re-
alism because the latter doesn’t look so plausible any more in view 
of such examples. The philosophical literature about computer 
simulations too suggests an alternative picture: When we describe 
the simulation in terms of cats, galaxies and the like, we refer to an 
imagined system and in this sense a fiction. The computer simulation 
furnishes handy descriptions of this fiction.
I have then analyzed the way in which Chalmers unfolds his real-
ism. I have argued that he obtains realism too cheap because he does 
21 Note that evidence-transcendence is a signature of a thicker type of realism 
(Wright 1993: 2). That Chalmers‘s realism doesn‘t allow for evidence-transcen-
dence shows once more that his realism is pretty thin.
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not address a couple of problems. A real realism cannot be developed 
as easily as that. The butter and the bread, it seems, is quite close to 
fictionalism.
All this is of course not to deny that there are cats like Tina’s and 
that they instantiate properties in some sense. But I don’t think that 
Chalmers’s virtual realism or a different type of virtual realism is a 
plausible way to make sense of this. The alternative that has emerged 
is that we are referring to a fictional scenario, or a fiction, when we 
talk about Tina’s cat.
Admittedly, from this perspective, virtual realism confronts us 
with a new interesting borderline case. Until recently, our means of 
fiction telling were very poor. We could talk about the fictional sce-
nario, maybe play it on stage for two hours or produce a movie. Com-
puters have greatly extended our ways of fiction-telling (that comput-
er simulations have extended our capacities in other ways is stressed 
by Humphreys 2004). We can now produce experiences of fictional 
objects that do not lack behind the experiences we have from objects 
from the real world. Moreover, the production of the fiction is to a 
large extent automated. We can even allow for some interaction with 
the fiction. So the fiction is now so manifest that it is tempting to call 
it a reality of its own. I don’t think we should succumb to this temp-
tation. There isn’t enough warrant for such a realism.
So, maybe, the best way to put my conclusion is to say that Chalm-








22 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for detailed and constructive com-
ments, which have led to significant improvements of this paper. Thanks also to 
R. Joggi for his comments. An early version of the paper was presented at KIT 
Karlsruhe, and I’d like to thank the audience, in particular G. Betz and M. Poznic 
for interesting comments and questions. Thanks also to D. Yates for his invitation 
to contribute this paper and for his patience.
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